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Abstract. In order for voters to verify their votes, they have to carry
out additional steps besides selecting a candidate and submitting their
vote. In previous work, voters have been found to be confused about the
concept of and motivation for verifiability in electronic voting when con-
fronted with it. In order to better communicate verifiability to voters, we
identify mental models of verifiability in voting using a questionnaire dis-
tributed online in Germany. The identified mental models are, Trusting,
No Knowledge, Observer, Personal Involvement and Matching models.
Within the same survey, we identify terms that can be used in place of
‘verify’ as well as security-relevant metaphors known to the voters that
can be used to communicate verifiability.
c©2013 Springer. The final publication is available at http://link.springer.com/
chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-642-39185-9_4.
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1 Introduction
Internet voting continues to generate great interest, with a recent survey in Ger-
many [1] finding that more than 50% of eligible voters would cast their vote over
the Internet for federal elections. Despite this interest, security experts have ex-
pressed concern over the integrity of Internet voting, for example Simons and
Jones [2]. Verifiability offers some assurance of the integrity of votes cast in
an election - both in traditional as well as in Internet-based elections. Voters
however, have to carry out additional steps to verify the integrity of their indi-
vidual votes (and if they are interested, all votes) cast in an election. While in
traditional paper-based elections voters are not confronted with verifying (e.g.
assuming that poll workers do not ask voters to remain behind to verify that
votes are properly tallied), they are in Internet based elections: In the vote cast-
ing interface, there might be a button to click on to verify, a link to the bulletin
board, or voters get a receipt to verify later on.
Sherman et al. [3] and Volk et al. [4] found that voters are confused about the
concept of and motivation for verifiability. Similarly, Schneider et al. [5] report
that voters expressed confusion over use of the term ‘receipt’. This confusion
and lack of understanding and motivation in voters shows the need to investi-
gate mental models of verifiability in voting to base future communication of
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verifiability on these models. It also shows the need to use a different term or
phrase for ‘verifying’. In this work we seek to identify mental models of and
terms for verifiability. We define mental models as ‘voters’ knowledge, beliefs
and attitudes of verifiability as they cast votes in postal voting and paper-based
voting at the polling station’. We use a questionnaire distributed online.
The mental models are identified as Trusting, No Knowledge1, Observer, Per-
sonal Involvement and Matching models. The most appropriate term identified
is check. While we concentrate in this work on Internet-based verifiable voting
systems, our findings are relevant to verifiable e-voting systems in general, as
the mental models identified are based on traditional voting systems.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: we give background
information in Section 2 on verifiability and voting procedures in Germany, fol-
lowed by a discussion of related work in usable verifiable electronic voting in
Section 3. We present the methodology of our study in Section 4, the results in
Section 5, and discuss the implications of our findings and future work in Section
6.
2 Background
Background information is provided on the verifiability definitions, and the vot-
ing processes in Germany are introduced briefly as the questionnaire was dis-
tributed to German citizens.
Verifiability definitions. Verifiability addresses the following three aspects: Cast
as intended - the voter can verify that his vote has been cast as he intended;
Stored as cast - the voter can verify that his vote is stored for tabulation as he
cast it; and Tallied as stored - anybody can verify that all votes have been tallied
as they were stored2.
Voting processes in Germany. In Germany, voters can cast paper votes at the
polling station, or register for absentee voting and use postal voting. Postal vot-
ing has been provided in Germany since 1956 to cater for voters who for one
reason or another cannot cast their vote in person at a polling station [7]. Fur-
thermore, postal voting has continued to experience increasing use, with 21.4%
of voters using postal voting for the 2009 federal elections [7]. Another special
provision for German elections is that ordinary voters and interested parties are
allowed to remain at the polling station, including the location where postal
votes are stored and tallied, to observe election processes during set up, voting
and the tallying of votes, as long as they do not disrupt the proceedings [8].
1 By no knowledge, we refer to participants who were uncertain how to verify votes in
postal voting, and paper voting, despite the fact that voters are allowed to observe
voting processes in Germany.
2 While these are the definitions selected for this work, other definitions of verifiability
exist in the literature, for example [6].
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3 Related Work
Different techniques have been applied to identify mental models in voting.
Schneider et al. [5] carried out a series of focus group sessions to evaluate, among
other issues, voters’ understanding of security mechanisms in an early version of
Prêt à Voter. Storer et al. [9] also interacted with participants in focus groups
and additionally used videotaped scenarios to study voters’ attitudes towards a
pollsterless remote voting system. Campbell and Byrne [10] investigated voters’
mental model of straight party voting using an online survey, while Yao and
Murphy [11], used a paper-based survey to evaluate voters’ perceptions of, and
their intention to use, telephone and web-based interfaces of remote electronic
voting systems.
Since few studies have been carried out to specifically investigate voters’
mental models in voting, we also considered literature in the field of computer
security. Raja et al. [12] carried out a lab study of Vista Basic firewall, and
a firewall prototype that included contextual information of the current and
future network states. Almuhimedi et al. [13] used a survey and a lab study in
web certificate management.
Using semi-structured interviews, Raja et al. [14] explored participants’ knowl-
edge, requirements, perceptions and misconceptions about personal firewalls.
Friedman et al. [15] tested users’ conceptions of web security using semi-structured
interviews that included a drawing task. Ho et al. [16] interviewed caretakers
of wireless home computer networks to understand how they deployed and se-
cured the networks. Wash [17] conducted interviews to understand users’ folk
models of attackers and security technologies. Dourish et al. [18] carried out
semi-structured interviews to identify people’s perceptions of security.
Mental models of computer security [19] and privacy and security [20] were
identified from literature and tested in a two-card sorting experiment [21], [22],
[23] involving experts and non-experts. Bravo-Lillo et al. [24] used scenarios in
open-ended interviews to evaluate mental models of computer security warnings.
We see a variety of approaches used to identify mental models in voting
and in computer security. In this study, we distributed a questionnaire online to
participants, integrating scenario diagrams to elicit terms for verifiability.
4 Methodology
The research questions and study instruments, participant recruitment, data
analysis, and ethical considerations for the study, are described in this section.
All study materials were written in English and translated into German. The
data collected was translated into English for analysis and reporting. The trans-
lations were verified for accuracy by the authors. Additionally, the data collected
on terms for verifiability was analyzed in German since future work will investi-
gate their use in Germany.
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4.1 Research Questions and Study Instruments
The research question is: What mental models do participants have of verifiabil-
ity in postal voting and paper voting at the polling station? This was explored
by asking participants the following questions addressing different aspects of
verifiability:
– how they could tell that their individual postal vote was not modified or
removed on its way to the town hall and into the ballot box (Q1postal).
– how they could tell that their postal or paper vote was not modified or
removed from the ballot box, (Q2postal) and (Q2paper).
– how they could tell that their postal or paper vote was included in the final
tally, (Q3postal) and (Q3paper).
– how they could tell that all postal or paper votes were included in the final
tally, (Q4postal) and (Q4paper).
These questions were derived from the stored as cast and tallied as stored
verifiability definitions. Note the problem with the first verifiability step: cast
as intended, i.e. making sure that the vote is not modified before being sent
is not a concern in paper-based elections and thus is not addressed here. The
questionnaire is shown in Table 5 in the Appendix. Participants first answered
demographic questions which acted as screening questions to allow exclusion of
data from participants who did not meet the requirements (see Subsection 4.2).
Scenario diagrams, shown in Figures 1 to 6, were developed by a professional
graphic designer and used to obtain terms for verifiability.
4.2 Participant Recruitment
Participants were recruited to form a convenience sample [25]. We did not seek
participants representative of the German population, rather we aimed to carry
out an exploratory study to identify research questions for further investigation
on mental models of verifiability. We therefore do not generalize our findings to
the entire population. Invitation emails were first sent to an initial pool of partici-
pants known to the authors, then a second email, containing a URL and password
to access the questionnaire, was sent to those participants who expressed inter-
est in the study. This approach has been shown to improve response rates [26].
These participants were requested to forward the email to other persons whom
they thought would be interested in participating, in a snowballing technique
[27]. Participants represented different age groups and professional backgrounds
including retired workers. Eligible participants were German citizens, used the
Internet, and were over the age of 18 (in order to be eligible to vote in elections).
Participants were not offered compensation, instead we asked those interested to
provide their email addresses3 to receive information on the results of the survey
[28].
Out of 55 participants who filled out the questionnaire online, 11 did not
complete it. We therefore consider data from 44 participants. There were 31
3 Participants’ email addresses were not linked to their responses.
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male and 13 female respondents. Ten participants had been educated up to
high school level, and 34 had university education. Forty participants reported
using the Internet everyday, while four used it every two to three days. Data on
participants’ age ranges and level of computer proficiency (measured by asking
participants whether they install computer programs on their computers) are
shown in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively.
Age Number
19 - 34 16
35 - 44 9
45 - 54 8
55 - 64 8
65+ 3
Table 1: Demographic Data –
Age
Computer Proficiency Number
Install on their own 20
Need help to install 10
Others ask them for help 13
Do not install 1
Table 2: Demographic Data –
Computer Proficiency
4.3 Data Analysis
Responses were analyzed using content analysis and open coding [29]. In con-
tent analysis, participants’ responses are analyzed and categorized using ex-
plicit rules. Open coding was used in order to obtain emerging themes from par-
ticipants’ responses, rather than beginning the data analysis with pre-selected
themes. If one participant mentioned several concepts, each was coded under an
appropriate theme. We used spreadsheets to assign the different concepts and
themes to each question. For example, a response such as No knowledge, only
trust in regulated procedures and sanctions and mutual control during the count
by the people present, as well as to this day minor known cases of abuse was
identified to have the following relevant concepts: No Knowledge, Trust in pro-
cesses, and Observers present. These concepts were grouped into themes, which
form the mental models. One participant could have expressed several concepts
that would be classified under different mental models. The concepts identified in
this example were then categorized under No Knowledge, Trusting and Observer
models.
Two researchers independently reviewed a subset of the data and identified
concepts and emerging themes from participants’ responses. A Cohen’s Kappa
of 0.65 was obtained. Any value above 0.60 indicates acceptable inter-rater re-
liability [29]. The remaining responses were then analyzed. In coding the data,
one question was analyzed in its entirety before researchers moved on to analyze
the next question. This process was repeated until all participants’ responses to
all questions had been analyzed, and emerging themes identified.
We analyzed participants’ responses based on the meaning of phrases and the
response as a whole, first identifying concepts and themes and then the mental
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Fig. 1: The Ballot Box is Empty Fig. 2: The Voter is Eligible
Fig. 3: The Voter goes alone into
the Voting Booth
Fig. 4: Eligible Voters’ Votes are
in the Ballot Box
Fig. 5: The Seal is Broken and
the Ballot Box is Empty
Fig. 6: All Votes are Properly
Tallied
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models. We observed that two themes, specifically, trusting and no knowledge,
were identified in participants’ responses to (Q1postal). The remaining themes
were identified while analyzing responses from (Q2postal) to (Q4postal) and from
(Q2paper) to (Q4paper). Concepts within the themes primarily remained the same
for the different questions, though there was a slight change, reflecting the dif-
fering situations presented in the questions, that is, moving from vote storage to
tallying of votes. As such, it is likely that theoretical saturation [30] was attained
at this point and unlikely that introducing more participants would reveal any
new themes.
4.4 Ethical Considerations
Ethical requirements for research involving human participants are provided
by an ethics commission at the university4. The relevant ethical requirements
regarding participant consent and data privacy were met. Participants were first
informed about the purpose of the study, after which they could decide whether
or not to proceed to the questionnaire. They were informed that the purpose of
the study was to better understand preferences for Internet voting based on use
of traditional voting systems, to avoid causing bias by referring to integrity in
voting or verifiability. In order to meet the data privacy requirement, a privacy
statement was provided on the questionnaire, assuring participants that their
data would only be collected for research purposes, their identity would not be
linked to their responses, and their data would not be passed on to third parties.
Furthermore, participants’ data was only handled by researchers involved in the
project.
5 Results
We present the results of this work, first discussing the different mental models
of verifiability in voting that have been identified, and metaphors and terms that
can be used in reference to verifiability processes.
5.1 Mental Models
A number of mental models were identified from participants’ responses. Specif-
ically, Trusting, No Knowledge, Observer, Personal Involvement, and Matching
models were identified. Examples of the concepts identified and accompanying
mental models are shown in Table 4 in the Appendix. As mentioned above,
themes overlapped with respect to the concepts, for instance, for the Trusting
and Observer models, in the case where participants trust that observers will
notice manipulations.
We first discuss each of the mental models and then propose metaphors and
terms participants used while answering the questions and which might be used
4 http://www.intern.tu-darmstadt.de/gremien/ethikkommisson/index.en.jsp
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to improve the communication of verifiability. The mental models are reported
in this section based on the number of concepts identified; those with a high
number of concepts are listed first.
Trusting Model: Participants’ responses indicated that they had blind trust,
trust in persons, or trust in processes for integrity of their individual votes and
all votes cast in an election. Another new concept was trust (no option), with the
participant stating ‘I have to trust in it’. As participants moved from question
Q1postal to question Q4postal, new concepts emerged such as: trust in observers
in Q2postal, trust the count in Q3postal, and trust in the public count of votes
in Q4postal, as an example, one participant stated ‘... one also has to trust
in the count’. The concept of the envelope used in postal voting being sealed
was observed, with a participant stating ’...I trust that the sealed envelope is
only opened to count my vote’. Similarly, new concepts were observed across the
responses in Q2paper through to Q4paper, for example, trust in the public count
of votes.
No Knowledge Model: Participants’ responses indicated they were either
not sure how to ascertain the integrity of their individual vote and other voters’
votes, or they considered that there was no way for this to be done. Participants
stated, for example, ‘I don’t know’, ‘You can never know’, and ‘Not at all’. We
also noted that many concepts in this model were linked to other concepts from
different mental models, for example, one participant responded ‘I don’t know;
I trust’, and another, ‘I don’t know; I trust that the procedure of the election is
properly monitored’.
Observer Model: Participants referred mostly to observers being present dur-
ing the vote casting process and the tallying of votes. One participant referred
to the presence of observers which assured him of the integrity of his individ-
ual vote in Q1postal and a few referred to the presence of observers in Q2postal
to Q4postal. As an example, one participant said ‘Therefore election observers
are permitted...’, in response to Q3postal. In paper voting, participants expressed
assurance of how their vote was handled because observers were present. Since
different election workers were present and likely to have different party affilia-
tions, participants also considered them as playing a role in ensuring the integrity
of the voting process. Additionally, participants referred to election workers ob-
serving each other, and the results being verified by several people. The election
workers were referred to more times in response to Q2paper to Q4paper, which
could be because participants interact with them more during the voting pro-
cess, in comparison to postal voting, where voters might never interact with the
election workers in person.
Additionally, participants were assured of the integrity of their votes and
all votes since they were counted in public. Relevant concepts were observed
in Q3postal and Q4postal with one participant indicating ‘Due to the fact that
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the count is done in public...’. Relevant concepts were identified from Q2paper
to Q4paper. In the responses given, participants did not specify how the public
count could ensure the integrity of individual votes and all votes.
Personal Involvement Model: Participants made reference to being person-
ally involved in the tallying process by observing the tallying of votes in person
(Q4postal) with this participant stating ‘I can watch the count of the absentee
votes...’. Other concepts were submitting the vote personally (Q2paper), observing
in person (Q3paper) and participating in the public count (Q4paper).
Matching Model: Participants responses made reference to checking that the
final results matched the observed results (Q4postal) and that the number of votes
matched the number of participating voters(Q2paper).
5.2 Further Results
We identified a number of metaphors from participants’ responses, which can be
tailored to communicate verifiability. Furthermore, terms that participants use
to describe verifiability are reported.
Metaphors: A number of metaphors were identified from participants’ re-
sponses. The ballot box was referred to as being sealed (in both postal voting
and paper voting), and physically protected (in postal voting). The envelope be-
ing sealed gave assurance to one participant that any tampering with his postal
vote would be detected ‘...because the envelope would have to be opened and the
vote then becomes invalid’ (Q2postal).
Terms For Verifiability: Terms were obtained from participants’ responses to
describe the action of the man in black (Figures 1 to 6). These and accompanying
English translations are shown in Table 3. Some participants used multiple terms
to describe the action. Responses that only appeared once are grouped together
under ‘Other’.
English translation German term Count
To observe beobachten 18
To check kontrollieren 10
To verify überprüfen 6
To monitor überwachen 5
Other 11
Table 3: Terms for Verifiability
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6 Discussion
User studies of voters’ interaction with verifiable voting systems, for example
in [3] and [31], show that voters are confused about the concept of verifiability.
In this work, we have identified the mental models of verifiability of German
voters to gain insights on how to improve voters’ understanding of verifiabil-
ity. Specifically, we have identified Trusting, No Knowledge, Observer, Personal
involvement, and Matching mental models.
Our results indicate that there are gaps in voters’ knowledge, beliefs and
attitudes towards verifiability in voting as more concepts were identified for the
Trusting and No Knowledge mental models. These gaps need to be closed by
communicating verifiability. One approach could be to inform voters that the
trust-inducing elements present in traditional (paper-based) voting systems, for
example, observers, are not the same in Internet voting. The argument could
then follow that voters need to personally act as observers, or that they need to
carry out extra steps.
Our findings on the mental models can be employed to improve user inter-
faces for verifiable voting. While one option would be to first identify voters’
mental models and then communicate verifiability according to the model(s)
that voters have, legal requirements are that all voters receive the same informa-
tion. Correspondingly, in future work, we will investigate designing an interface
that is adequate for several – ideally all – identified mental models. Future work
will also consider the effect that this improved communication has on voters
checking their votes.
Moreover, the metaphors and terms for verifiability identified in this work
will be applied in the improved communication. The identified metaphors, sealed
and protected ballot box and sealed envelope, can be exploited to communicate
individual verifiability. One option could be in providing a contrast, for example,
informing voters that while these aspects are present in postal voting and paper-
based voting at the polling station, they are not available in Internet voting, thus
prompting the voter to participate in verifiability processes.
Similarly, further research will utilize the German terms that participants
used to refer to verifying. While ‘observe’ is the highest ranking term, we consider
that the term ‘check’ offers more options for use in communicating verifiability to
voters. Some sample phrases are ‘check the vote preparation process’, and ‘check
the correctness of the counting process’. The appropriateness of these and other
phrases will be evaluated in future work.
Since this study targeted German voters, it would be of interest to identify
and compare additional mental models in other cultures, as well as to conduct
additional quantitative work to determine each mental model’s prevalence.
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A Relevant Study Data













Published results match observed ones




Public count of votes
Personal Involvement Can observe personally
Table 4: Some Identified Concepts Grouped Under Mental Models
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SECTION QUESTIONS
Demographics
Please select your age range.
[18 and under, 19 - 34, 35 - 44, 45 - 54, 55 - 64, over 65]
What is your gender?
[Male, Female]
What is your highest level of education?
[High school or less, Some college, Bachelor’s degree, Master’s
degree, PhD]
How often do you use the Internet?
[Every day, Every two or three days, Once a week, Once every
two weeks, Once a month]
Which of the following statements is true in most cases?
[I need help to install programs on my computer, I install com-
puter programs on my computer, Other people ask me to help
them install programs on their computers, I do not install pro-
grams on my computer]
Mental Model (Paper Voting)
How can you tell that the paper vote you cast at the polling
station was not modified or removed from the ballot box?
How can you tell that the paper vote you cast at the polling
station was included in the final tally, that is, as it was stored
in the ballot box?
How can you tell that the paper votes cast at the polling stations
are included in the final tally, as they were stored in the ballot
box?
Mental Model (Postal Voting)
How can you tell that your postal vote was not modified or
removed on its way to the town hall and into the ballot box?
How can you tell that your postal vote was not modified or
removed from the ballot box?
How can you tell that your postal vote was included in the final
tally, that is, as it was stored in the ballot box?
How can you tell that all postal votes are included in the final
tally, as they were stored in the ballot box?
Verifiability Terms Kindly give one word or phrase to describe what the man in
black (in reference to the scenario diagrams) is doing
Table 5: Questions from the Study Questionnaire
